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RECENT DECISIONS
that there should have been some indication of exactly what deponent
had personally observed, what he had heard from others, and what he
had learned from the reports or records of the Bureau of Narcotics.
It seems that if the source is indicated in a way that will satisfy the
courts, that type of fact, generally known as evidentiary, must be
pleaded. That the defendant distributed narcotics is an ultimate fact.
The circumstances which enable one to make the assertion are evidenti-
ary facts, and it seems that this is what the courts require.
In conclusion, the policy which the courts seek to effectuate in en-
forcing the requirement of a showing of probable cause is one of re-
quiring the magistrate issuing the warrant or summons to come to his
own conclusions as to whether it (probable cause) exists. The purpose
is to place a barrier-presumably impartial-between the law enforce-
ment officer who might stand to gain by acquiring a warrant, and the
party whose arrest is sought. Obviously, a recital of the elements of the
crime and the fact that the defendant committed it is not going to be
enough. This is no more than stating a legal conclusion and is in-
sufficient even in a civil complaint. It helps if the complainant indicates
the sources of his belief. By doing this he necessarily brings in more
facts. However, even this will be insufficient if these sources are stated
generally as they vere in Greenberg and DiBella. One is drawn un-
avoidably to the conclusion that the courts, in no matter what terms they
state their criticisms, are all ultimately requiring evidentiary, as op-
posed to ultimate, facts or legal conclusions. This is the type of fact
specifically suggested in Greenberg. These facts by their nature allow
the magistrate to draw his own conclusion and thus fulfill the policy
the courts are trying to enforce. MARY C. CAHILL
Sales: What Constitutes Sufficient Notification for Breach of
Warranty-A tire purchased by plaintiff-Wojciuk from one of the
defendants, Stuewer, blew out, causing the automobile in which the
plaintiffs were riding to turn over. Plaintiff-wife suffered serious bodily
injuries. Defendant-Stuewer had told the plaintiffs that the tire would
never blow out, and advertisements also stated that the tire was guaran-
teed for life against any defects. On the day of the accident the plaintiff,
Wojciuk, telephoned defendant, Stuewer, and told him of the mishap,
saying, "Herb, what kind of tires did you sell me?.. .We had a blowout
and a terrible accident resulted from it."' The plaintiffs subsequently
brought suit against Stuewer for "breach of express warranty that the
tire would not blow out suddenly" and for "breach of implied warranty
of merchantable quality and fitness" in Woiciuk v. United States Rubber
'Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 235, 120 N.W. 2d 47,
53 (1963).
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Co.2 Plaintiffs also brought suit against United States Rubber Company
for negligence in manufacture and inspection and against Phillips Pe-
troleum Company for negligence in manufacture because the tire was
represented to the public as Phillips' own product.
In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked for the first
time to decide whether or not section 121.49 of the Wisconsin Statutes '
required notification from the buyer to the seller in cases of breach of
warranty involving personal injury rather than commercial loss. The
court decided that under its interpretation of section 121.49, prompt
notice of the breach was necessary to preserve one's cause of action.4
Upon rehearing, the court decided that the question of whether or not
the telephone conversation was adequate notification of the breach of
warranty was for the jury.5 Apparently, in holding the notice of Wojciuk
to Stuewer to be a jury question rather than insufficient notification as
a matter of law, the Wisconsin court mitigated its requirements of
notification under section 121.49 of the Wisconsin Statutes.6
In the Woiciuk case, the Wisconsin court adopted the majority
position requiring notice of breach of an express warranty in order to
recover in a personal injury case.7 The majority view is based on section
49 of the Uniform Sales Act, which expressly requires that notice of
the breach be given to the seller. The Indiana court, holding the minority
position, in Wright, Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett decided that notice of
breach of warranty was not a prerequisite to the buyer's cause of action.
Also taking the minority position, the intermediate appellate courts of
New York did not require notice of breach of warranty when personal
2 Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 120 N.W. 2d 47 (1963),
motion for rehearing granted, 121 N.W. 2d 294 (1963), modified on rehearing,
122 N.W. 2d 737 (1963).
3 Wis. STAT. §121.49 (1961), UNIFORM SALES Acr §49, "In the absence of ex-
press or implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the
buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal
remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the
sale. But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to
the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time
after the buyer knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not
be liable therefor."
4 Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., - Wis. 2d -, 122 N.W. 2d 737 (1963).
5 Id. at 740.
6 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Sunde, 19 Wis. 2d 129, 119 N.W. 2d 321 (1963) ; Schaefer
v. Weber, 265 Wis. 160, 60 N.W. 2d 696 (1953) ; Marsh Wood Products Co.
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 2d 392 (1932).
73 WILLISTON, SALES §484(b) (rev. ed. 1948).
8235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E. 2d 713 (1955).
9 Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act by the Indiana Legislature,
"notice of breach of warranty was not a prerequisite to the bringing of an
action by the buyer for such breach." In the Wright Bachman case, the
court did not alter the previous law but interpreted §70 of the Uniform Sales
Act to mean that notice of the breach of warranty was unnecessary. Section
70 states that nothing in this act "shall affect the right of the buyer or the
seller to recover interest or special damages in any case where by law
interest or special damages may be recoverable."
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injuries were sustained.10 The notice requirement has been criticized by
authorities in the field of torts. 1 In the Wojciuk case, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected the decision of the Indiana court and stated,
in the dicta, that the purpose of section 70 of the Uniform Sales Act was
to define liability and not to exempt the notification requirement of
section 49.12
Sufficient notification under section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act re-
quires the buyer to notify the seller within a "reasonable time" after the
breach has occurred' 3 that the buyer will look to him for damages.'4 The
majority of courts require the notification of a breach of warranty to
conform to the above standard because "Itlhe purpose of a notice of the
breach of warranty is to permit the seller to investigate the claim" and
to protect the seller against belated damage claims.' 5 What "constitutes
reasonable time must be determined from the particular circumstances
in the individual case."' 0 For example, in Tegen v. Chapin,1" the Wis-
consin court held fifty-seven days to be an unreasonable time, while in
Bonker v. Ingersoll Products Corporation,s a federal court held a delay
of four months before notifying the buyer of the breach of warranty
to be within a reasonable time.
The court in deciding, as a matter of law, whether or not notification
of the breach was made within a reasonable time, will look for any cir-
cumstances excusing or justifying the delay.19 Extenuating circum-
stances, such as, latent defects2" or the seller's acting in such a manner
as to induce the buyer to delay,2' will extend what normally is considered
to be a reasonable time. However, the general rule (at least the rule
intended for the protection of the buyer) is that once the buyer is aware
or ought to have been aware of the defect in the goods, he should
promptly notify the seller of the defects or they will be deemed to have
been waived.
2 3
The problem of determining what a notification must contain in
10 Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121
(1923); Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co. 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 916
(1943).
112 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §28.17 (1st ed. 1956). The authors
warned that the majority rule "may prove a trap to the unwary victim who
will generally not be steeped in the 'business practice' which justifies the rule."
"2 Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., supra note 4.
13 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 7.
14 Mack Truck, Inc. v. Sunde, supra note 6.
15 Hellenbrand v. Bowar, 16 Wis. 2d 264, 270, 114 N.W. 2d 418, 421 (1961).
1G Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 869, 280 P. 2d 235, 237 (1954).
17 176 Wis. 410, 187 N.W. 185 (1922).
18 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955).
19 Tegan v. Chapin, supra note 17.
20 anas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corporation, 93 Utah
414, 73 P. 2d 1272 (1937).
21 Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W. 2d 788 (1952).
22 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 7.
23 Locke v. Williamson, 40 Wis. 377, 381 (1876).
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order to be adequate was a significant issue in the Wojciuk case.2" The
telephone conversation between plaintiff-Wojicuk and defendant-
Stuewer seemed to fall short of informing Stuewer that Wojciuk was
going to look to him for damages. Wojciuk, in the telephone conversa-
stion, did not make any reference to damages, nor did he say anything
concerning his intention to exercise his legal rights. By permitting the is-
sue of sufficient notification for breach of warranty to go to the jury
in this case, the Wisconsin court appeared to alleviate the strict pre-
requisites of notification required in prior cases.
The statute [section 121.49 Wisconsin Statutes] does not
require that the notice shall be in any particular form. It should
fairly advise the seller of the defect asserted in the performance
of a particular promise or sale; it should repel any inference of
waiver, and at least by implication should assert that there has
been a violation of the buyer's legal rights.2 5
Until the Wojciuk case, the Wisconsin court consistently had held that
the "notice is sufficient if it fairly apprises the seller the buyer looks to
him for damages.
26
As is evidenced by the Wojciuk case, there seems to be a trend in
judicial thinking toward mitigating the requirements of the sufficiency
of notice of breach of warranty. This trend is embodied in the inter-
pretive comment subsequent to section 2-607 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code recently adopted by the Wisconsin Legislature.21 Section
2-607(3) states:
Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy....
The fourth comment on said section reads:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying com-
mercial standards to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for
notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different
standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of
requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith,
not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy.
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let
the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must
be watched. There is no reason to require that the notification
which saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a
clear statement of all the objections that will be relied upon by
the buyer .... Nor is there any reason for requiring the notifica-
24 Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., supra note 4, at 740.
25 Ingalls v. Meissnes, 11 Wis. 2d 371, 384, 105 N.W. 2d 748, 755 (1960) ; Annot.,
53 A.L.R. 2d 266, 269 (1957).26Ace Engineering Co. v. West Bend Malting Co., 244 Wis. 91, 93, 11 N.W. 2d
627, 628 (1943).
27 Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 158. (To become effective July 1, 1965).
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tion to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or
other resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's
rights under this Article need only be such as informs the seller
that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens
the way for normal settlement through negotiations. 28 [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Wisconsin will
establish a standard for the element of "reasonable time" required for
proper notification of breach of warranty. The requirement of adequate
notification, as modified by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Woiciuk
case, seems to conform to the philosophy of the Uniform Commercial
Code, set forth above. JAmES Wm. DVYER
Torts: Abolishment of Parental Immunity in Wisconsin-In re-
cent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has been systematically abro-
gating the doctrine of immunity. Charitable immunity in Kojis v. Dod-
tor's Hospital,' governmental immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,2
religious immunity in Widell v. Holy Trini/y Catholic Church,3 and
most recently parental immunity in Goller v. White4 have been elimi-
nated. Under the holding in the Goller case, a parent may now be liable
to his child for negligence, unless the alleged act involves an exercise
of parental authority or ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing and other care.
Daniel G. Goller, a twelve-year-old, was injured while riding on a
farm tractor driven by his foster father, James J. White. The boy's
guardian ad litem brought an action against White and Farmers Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Company to recover damages, alleging that
White was negligent in allowing the child to ride on the draw-bar of the
tractor and that Farmers Mutual had issued a policy of liability insur-
ance to White which covered the child's injuries. The trial court dis-
missed both complaints on the grounds that the insurance policy afforded
no coverage to the plaintiff and that White stood in loco parentis to the
plaintiff and could not be held liable in negligence.
On appeal, the supreme court considered the parental immunity
doctrine, first noting the growing tendency to depart from the holding
in Wick v. Wick5 which was cited by the trial court as authority for its
determination. The rationale of the Wick decision preventing a child
from suing his parent for negligence, was that a contrary holding would
introduce discord and contention into the family relationship. The de-
28 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607, comment 4 (Official Text, 1962).
1 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 107 N.W. 2d 292 (1961).
2 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962).
3 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W. 2d 249 (1963).
4 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W. 2d 193 (1963).
5 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
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